

Curriculum Vitae

Yeon-Koo Che

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CONTACT

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EDUCATION

Stanford University, Ph.D., 1991 (Advisor: Paul Milgrom)

EMPLOYMENT

Professor, Columbia University, 2005-;

Professor, University of Wisconsin, 2000-2006;

Associate Professor, University of Wisconsin, 1997-2000;

Assistant Professor, University of Wisconsin, 1991-1997;

EDITORIAL POSITIONS

Associate Editor: *Econometrica* (2010-2017).

Advisory Editor: *Games and Economic Behavior* (2015-).

Associate Editor: *Theoretical Economics* (2005-2015).

Editor: *Journal of Industrial Economics* (2003-2009).

Associate Editor: *Journal of Economic Theory* (2008- 2010).

AWARDS AND HONOR

Fellow of the Game Theory Society (elected 2023).

Colin Clark Lecture: Australasian Meeting Econometric Society 2022.

Keynote Speaker, Latin American Meeting of Econometric Society (Guyaquil, Ecuador) 2018

Plenary Speaker, Asian Meeting of Econometric Society (Seoul, Korea) 2018

Council Member of the Game Theory Society (elected 2017).

Jacob Marschak Lecture, Australasian Meeting Econometric Society 2016

Council member of Asian Regional Standing Committee of Econometric Society (elected 2015)

President, Korea America Economic Association (2015-2016).

Fellow of Economic Theory for the Society of Advancement of Economic Theory (elected 2014).

Fellow of the Econometric Society (elected 2010).

KAEA-Maekyung Economist Award, (KAEA; Maekyung Daily), 2009;

Cho Rakkyo Award, (Yonsei University), 2008; awarded to the best Korean economist.

SELECTED PUBLICATION (REFEREED JOURNALS)

- “Near-Utilitarian Characterization of Pareto Optima,” (with Jinwoo Kim, Fuhito Kojima and Chris Ryan), forthcoming, **Econometrica**.
- “Prolonged Learning and Hasty Stopping: the Wald Problem with Ambiguity,” (with Sarah Auster and Konrad Mierendorff), forthcoming, **American Economic Review**.
- “Bail-out Stigma,” (with Chongwoo Choe and Keeyoung Rhee), forthcoming, **Journal of Finance**.
- “The Effect of Privacy Regulation on the Data Industry: Empirical Evidence from GDPR,” (with Guy Aridor and Tobias Salz), forthcoming, **RAND Journal of Economics**.
- “Keeping the Listener Engaged: a Dynamic Model of Bayesian Persuasion,” (with Teddy Kim and Konrad Mierendorff), **Journal of Political Economy**, (2023), 131, 1797–1844.
- “Stable Matching with Mistaken Agents,” (with Georgy Artemov and Yinghua He), forthcoming, **Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics**, (2023), 1, 270–320.
- “Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation,” (with Elisabetta Iossa and Patrick Rey), **Review of Economic Studies**, (2021), 88, 2149–2178.
- “Efficiency, Justified Envy, and Incentives in Priority-Based Matching,” (with Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Parag Pathak, Alvin Roth and Olivier Tercieux), **American Economic Review: Insight**, (2020), 2, 425-442.
- “Optimal Dynamic Allocation of Attention,” (with Konrad Mierendorff), **American Economic Review**, (2019), 109, 2993-3029.
- “Efficiency and Stability in Large Matching Markets,” (with Olivier Tercieux), **Journal of Political Economy**, (2019), 127, 2301-2342.
- “Stable Matching in Large Economies,” (with Jinwoo Kim and Fuhito Kojima), **Econometrica**, (2019), 87, 65-110.
- “Recommender Systems as Mechanisms for Social Learning,” (with Johannes Hörner), the **Quarterly Journal of Economics**, (2018), 133, 871-925.
- “Weak Cartel and Optimal Auctions,” (with Daniele Condorelli and Jinwoo Kim), **Journal of Economic Theory**, (2018), 178, 398-435.
- “Payoff Equivalence of Efficient Mechanisms in Large Matching Markets,” (with Olivier Tercieux), **Theoretical Economics**, (2018), 13, 239-271.

- “An Experimental Study of Sponsored-Search Auctions,” (with Syngjoo Choi and Jinwoo Kim), **Games and Economic Behavior**, (2017), 102, 20-43.
- “Disclosure and Legal Advice” (with Sergei Severinov), **American Economic Journal: Microeconomics**, (2017), 9, 188-225.
- “Decentralized College Admissions” (with Youngwoo Koh), **Journal of Political Economy**, (2016), 124, 1295-1338.
- “Efficient Assignment with Interdependent Values,” (with Jinwoo Kim and Fuhito Kojima), **Journal of Economic Theory**, (2015), 158, 54-86.
- “Expanding Choice in School Choice,” (with Atila Abdulkadiroglu and Yosuke Yasuda), **American Economic Journal: Microeconomics**, (2015), 7(1), 1-42. (Lead article)
- “Credit Market Speculation and the Cost of Capital,” (with Rajiv Sethi), **American Economic Journal: Microeconomics**, (2014), 6(4), 1-34. (Lead article)
- “Generalized Reduced-Form Auctions: a Network-Flow Approach,” (with Jinwoo Kim and Konrad Mierendorff), **Econometrica**, (2013), 81, 2487-2520.
- “Designing Random Allocation Mechanisms: Theory and Applications,” (with Eric Budish, Fuhito Kojima, and Paul Milgrom), **American Economic Review**, (2013), 103, 585-623.
- “Pandering to Persuade,” (with Wouter Dessein and Navin Kartik), **American Economic Review**, (2013), 103, 47-79.
- “Assigning Resources to Budget-Constrained Agents,” (with Ian Gale and Jinwoo Kim), **Review of Economic Studies**, (2013), 80, 73-107.
- “Resolving Conflicting Preferences in School Choice: the ‘Boston’ Mechanism Reconsidered,” (with Atila Abdulkadiroglu and Yosuke Yasuda), **American Economic Review**, (2011), 101, 399-410.
- “Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms,” (with Fuhito Kojima), **Econometrica**, (2010), 78, 1625-1672.
- “Bidding with Securities: Comment,” (with Jinwoo Kim), **American Economic Review**, (2010), 100, 1929-35.
- “Opinions as Incentives,” (with Navin Kartik), **Journal of Political Economy**, (2009), 117, 815-860.
- “Optimal Collusion-Proof Auctions,” (with Jinwoo Kim), **Journal of Economic Theory**, (2009), 144, 565-603.

- "Strategic Judgment Proofing," (with Kathryn Spier), **Rand Journal of Economics**, (2008), 39, 926-48
- "The Role of Lockups in Takeover Contests," (with Tracy Lewis), **Rand Journal of Economics**, (2007), 38, 648-669.
- "Auctions with Asymmetric Information about Rivals' Types: an Experiment," (with Jim Andreoni and Jinwoo Kim), **Games and Economic Behavior**, (2007), 59, 240-259.
- "Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation," (with Jinwoo Kim), **Econometrica**, (2006), 74, 1063-1107.
- "Caps on Political Lobbying: Reply" (with Ian Gale), **American Economic Review**, (2006), 96, 1355-1360.
- "Revenue Comparisons for Auctions When Bidders Have Arbitrary Types," (with Ian Gale), **Theoretical Economics**, (2006), 1, 95-118.
- "A Dynamic Theory of Holdup," (with Jozsef Sakovics), **Econometrica**, (2004), 72, 1063-1103.
- "Competitive Procurement with Corruption," (with Roberto Burguet), **Rand Journal of Economics**, (2004), 35, 50-68.
- "Auctions with Asymmetric Information about Rivals' Types," (with Jinwoo Kim), **Games and Economic Behavior**, (2004), 46, 383-397.
- "Optimal Design of Research Contests" (with Ian Gale), **American Economic Review**, (2003), 93, 646-671.
- "Optimal Incentives for Teams," (with Seung-Weon Yoo), **American Economic Review**, (2001), 91, 525-541.
- "The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to Budget-Constrained Buyer," (with Ian Gale), **Journal of Economic Theory**, (2000), 92, 198-233.
- "Can a Contract Solve Hold-Up When Investments Have Externalities?: A Comment on De Fraja," **Games and Economic Behavior**, (2000), 33, 195-205.
- "Difference-Form Contests and the Robustness of All-Pay Auctions" (with Ian Gale), **Games and Economic Behavior**, (2000), 30, 22-43.
- "Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting," (with Don Hausch), **American Economic Review**, (1999), 89, 125-147.

- “Contract Damages and Cooperative Investments,” (with T-Y Chung), **Rand Journal of Economics**, (1999), 30, 84-105.
- “Standard Auctions with Financially-Constrained Buyers,” (with Ian Gale), **Review of Economic Studies**, (1998), Vol. 65, 1-21. (Reprinted in **The Economic Theory of Auctions**, edited by Paul Klemperer.)
- “Caps on Political Lobbying,” (with Ian Gale), **American Economic Review**, (1998), 88, 643-651.
- “Optimal Use of Information in Litigation: Does Withholding Information Deter Frivolous Suits?” (with Dietrich Earnhart), **Rand Journal of Economics**, (1997), 28, 120-134.
- “Equilibrium Formation of Class Action Suits,” **Journal of Public Economics**, (1996), 62, 339-361.
- “Revolving Doors and Optimal Tolerance for Agency Collusion,” **Rand Journal of Economics**, (1995), 26, 378-397.
- “Design Competition through Multidimensional Auctions,” **Rand Journal of Economics**, (1993), 24, 668-680. (Reprinted in **The Economic Theory of Auctions**, edited by Paul Klemperer.)
- “Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation,” (with A. Mitchell Polinsky) **Rand Journal of Economics**, (1991), 22, 562-570.

OTHER PUBLICATION

- “The NFL Should Auction Possession in Overtime Games,” (with Terry Hendershott), *The Economists’ Voice 2.0*, eds Aaron Edlin and Joseph Stiglitz, (2012), Columbia University Press.
- “Procurement,” *The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics*, Second Edition, (2006).
- “Hold-Up Problem,” (with Jozsef Sakovics), *The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics*, Second Edition, (2006).
- “Contests with Discontinuous Success Functions,” (with Ian Gale) in *Recent Developments in the Theory of Contests*, ed. Michael Baye, *Advances in Applied Microeconomics*, (1998), 7, 1-13, JAI Press Inc.
- “Financial Constraints in Auctions: Effects and Antidotes,” (with Ian Gale), in *Recent Developments in the Economics of Auctions*, ed. Michael Baye, *Advances in Applied Microeconomics*, (1996), 6, 97-120, JAI Press Inc.
- “Buy-In and Gold Plating under Defense Profit Policy,” in *Essays in the Economics of Procurement*, eds. Bower, G. A., and Dertouzous, J. N., (1994), RAND: National Defense Research Institute.

RESEARCH IN PROGRESS

- “Weak Monotone Comparative Statics,” (with Jinwoo Kim and Fuhito Kojima), R&R, **Econometrica**.
- “Robustly-Optimal Mechanisms for Selling Multiple Goods,” (with Weijie Zhong), R&R, **Review of Economic Studies**.
- “Optimal Queue Design,” (with Olivier Tercieux), R&R, **Journal of Political Economy**.
- “Statistical Discrimination in Ratings-Guided Markets,” (with Teddy Kim and Weijie Zhong).
- “Leveraging Uncertainties to Infer Preferences: Robust Analysis of School Choice,” (with Dong Woo Hahm and Yinghua He).
- “An Analysis of Top Trading Cycles in Two-Sided Matching Markets,” (with Olivier Tercieux).
- “Prestige Seeking in College Application and MajorChoice,” (with Dong Woo Hahm, Jinwoo Kim, Sejik Kim and Olivier Tercieux).

GRANTS

- National Science Foundation Grant, on “Studies on the Data-Driven Economy and School Choice” (PI), 2019-2022.
- National Science Foundation Grant, on “Matching Theory and College Admissions” (PI), 2013-2016.
- National Science Foundation Grant, on “Two Projects on Market Design” (PI), 2010-2013.
- National Science Foundation Grant, on “Market Design with Financially Constrained Agents” (PI), 2007-2010.
- National Science Foundation Grant, on “Holdup” (PI), 2003-2005.
- National Science Foundation Dissertation Grant, on “Experiment on Asymmetric Information Auctions,” (with Jinwoo Kim) 2002-2003.
- National Science Foundation Grant, on “Optimal Contest Design,” (PI), (with Ian Gale), 2000-2001.
- National Science Foundation Grant, on “Team Incentives,” 1998-1999.
- National Science Foundation Grant, on “Mechanism Design with Financial Constraints,” (PI), (with Ian Gale), 1996-1998.