Profile:

Yeon-Koo Che is Kelvin J. Lancaster Professor of Economic Theory at Columbia University. His early work contributes to the theory of mechanism and auction design: scoring-rule auctions, auctions with budget constraints, collusion-proof mechanism design, research contest, the incomplete contract paradigm for organization theory, and the matching theory in the context of college and school choice. His current research projects explore the implications of data-driven economic decision-making and resource allocation for welfare and distributional consequences.

He is a Fellow of the Econometric Society (elected 2009), a Fellow of Economic Theory (elected 2014) for the Society of Advancement of Economic Theory, and a Fellow of the Game Theory Society (elected 2023).  He served as a member of the Council of Game Theory Society (elected 2017) and of the Asian Regional Council of Econometric Society (elected 2016).  He served as Executive Director of the Program for Economic Research (2015-18).  He was editor of the Journal of Industrial Economics, and associate editor of Econometrica, and is currently serving as advisory editor of Games and Economic Behavior.  He was the inaugural recipient in 2008 of the Cho Rakkyo Prize and the KAEA-MK Prize in 2009.  He has given numerous Keynote addresses, including the Jacob Marschak Lecture at the Econometric Society meeting in Sydney (2016), the Asian Meeting of Econometric Society (2018), and the Latin American Meeting of Econometric Society (2018).  He has received nine National Science Foundation grants spanning over 20 years. He received a Ph.D. in Economics at the Stanford University.  He was a Professor at the University of Wisconsin before joining Columbia University as a Professor of Economics in 2005.  

Recent Publications:

"Near" Weighted Utilitarian Characterizations of Pareto Optima (with Jinwoo Kim, Fuhito Kojima, and Chris Ryan), Econometrica, forthcoming.

Prolonged Learning and Hasty Stopping: the Wald Problem with Ambiguity (with Sarah Auster and Konrad Mierendorff), American Economic Review, forthcoming.

Bailout Stigma (with Chongwoo Choe and Keeyoung Rhee), Journal of Finance, Online appendix, forthcoming.

The Effect of Privacy Regulation on the Data Industry: Empirical Evidence from GDPR (with Guy Aridor and Tobias Salz), RAND Journal of Economics, forthcoming.

Keeping the Listener Engaged: a Dynamic Model of Bayesian Persuasion (with Kyungmin Kim and Konrad Mierendorff), Journal of Political Economy, 2023. Slides. Recording: VSET (by Konrad Mierendorff).

Stable Matching with Mistaken Agents (with Georgy Artemov and Yinghua He), Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics, 2023.

Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation, (with Elisabetta Iossa and Patrick Rey), Review of Economic Studies, 2021.

To Trade, or not to Trade, that is the Question: New Roles for Incomplete Contracts in Dynamic Settings, (with Jozsef Sakovics), Journal of European Economic Association, 2021.

Efficiency, Justified Envy, and Incentives in Priority-Based Matching, (with Atila Abdulkadiroğlu, Parag Pathak, Alvin Roth, and Olivier Tercieux), Appendix, American Economic Review: Insights, 2020.

Optimal Dynamic Allocation of Attention, (with Konrad Mierendorff), Appendix, American Economic Review, 2019.

Efficiency and Stability in Large Matching Markets (with Olivier Tercieux), Appendix, Journal of Political Economy, 2019.

Stable Matching in Large Economies (with Jinwoo Kim and Fuhito Kojima), Appendix, Econometrica, 2019.

Recommender Systems as Mechanisms for Social Learning, (with Johannes Hörner), Appendix, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2018.

Weak Cartel and Collusion-Proof Auctions, (with Daniele Condorelli and Jinwoo Kim), Journal of Economic Theory, 2018. supplementary material.

Payoff Equivalence of Efficient Mechanisms in Large Matching Markets, (with Olivier Tercieux), Theoretical Economics, 2018.

Working Papers:

Prestige Seeking in College Application and Major Choice (with Dong Woo Hahm, Jinwoo Kim, Se-jik Kim, and Olivier Tercieux)

Robustly-Optimal Mechanisms for Selling Multiple Goods (with Weijie Zhong)

Optimal Queue Design (with Olivier Tercieux): online appendix Slides, Recordings: Short (15min); VSET; AMETS

Weak Monotone Comparative Statics (with Jinwoo Kim and Fuhito Kojima)

Statistical Discrimination in Ratings-Guided Markets (with Kyungmin Kim and Weijie Zhong)

Selected Publications:

Disclosure and Legal Advice, (with Sergei Severinov), American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2017.

An Experimental Study of Sponsored Search Auctions, (with Syngjoo Choi and Jinwoo Kim), Games and Economic Behavior, 2017, supplementary material

Decentralized College Admissions, (with Youngwoo Koh), Journal of Political Economy, 2016. Supplementary Appendix.

Efficient Assignment with Interdependent Values, (with Jinwoo Kim and Fuhito Kojima),  Journal of Economic Theory, 2015.

Expanding ‘Choice’ in School Choice, (with Atila Abdulkadiroglu and Yosuke Yasuda), American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2015.

Credit Market Speculation and the Cost of Capital, (with Rajiv Sethi),  American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2014. [VOX-EU piece on the paper]  formerly titled, Economic Consequences of Speculative Side Bets:  the Case of Naked Default Swaps.

Generalized Reduced-Form Auctions: a Network Flow Approach, (with Jinwoo Kim and Konrad Mierendorff), Econometrica (2013), Supplementary Appendix.

Designing Random Allocation Mechanisms: Theory and Applications, (with Eric Budish, Fuhito Kojima, and Paul Milgrom), American Economic Review, 2013, Supplementary Appendix.

Pandering to Persuade, (with Wouter Dessein and Navin Kartik), American Economic Review, 2013, Supplementary Appendix.

Assigning Resources to Budget-Constrained Agents, (with Ian Gale and Jinwoo Kim), Review of Economic Studies, 2013, Supplementary Appendix.

Resolving Conflicting Preferences in School Choice: the Boston Mechanism Reconsidered, (with Atila Abdulkadiroglu and Yosuke Yasuda), American Economic Review, 2011.

Bidding with Securities: Comment, (with Jinwoo Kim),  American Economic Review, 2010.

Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms, (with Fuhito Kojima), Econometrica, 2010.

Opinions as Incentives, (with Navin Kartik), Journal of Political Economy, 2009.

The NFL Should Auction Possession in Overtime Games, (with Terry Hendershott), The Economists’ Voice, 2009.

Optimal Collusion-Proof Auctions, (with Jinwoo Kim) Journal of Economic Theory, (2009)

Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation, (with Jinwoo Kim), Econometrica, (2006)

A Dynamic Theory of Holdup, (with Jozsef Sakovics), Econometrica (2004)

Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting, (with Don Hausch), American Economic Review, 1999.

Optimal Design of Research Contests, (with Ian Gale), American Economic Review, 2003.

Caps on Political Lobbying, (with Ian Gale), American Economic Review, 1998.

Caps on Political Lobbying: Reply, (with Ian Gale), American Economic Review, 2006.

Optimal Incentives for Teams, (with S.-W. Yoo), American Economic Review, 2001.

Revenue Comparisons for Auctions When Bidders Have Arbitrary Types, (with Ian Gale), Theoretical Economics, 2006.

Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders, (with Ian Gale), Review of Economic Studies, 1998.

The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to Budget-Constrained Buyer, (with Ian Gale), Journal of Economic Theory, 2000.

Asymmetric Information about Rivals’ Types in Standard Auctions: An Experiment (with Jim Andreoni and Jinwoo Kim), Games and Economic Behavior, 2007.

Strategic Judgment Proofing, (with Kathryn Spier), RAND Journal of Economics, 2008.

The Role of Lockups in Takeover Contests (with Tracy Lewis), RAND Journal of Economics, 2007.

Competitive Procurement with Corruption, (with R. Burguet), RAND Journal of Economics, 2004.

Design Competition through Multidimensional Auctions, RAND Journal of Economics, 1993.